Single Question. Whether the elements remain in a mixed body in their substance

Scotus, Sent. 2 d.15 q.1
Thomas, ST Ia q.76 a.4
Francis of Meyronne, Sent. 2 d.15 q.1
John Bacconitanus, Sent.3 d.16 q.1

1. About the fifteenth distinction the question is asked whether the elements remain in a mixed body in their substance.

2. That they do not. Because any mixed body is generated from the elements, but the generation of one thing is the corruption of another; therefore since a mixed body is generated from the elements, the elements are corrupted, otherwise the generation of it would be an alteration.

3. Again because the elements have inclinations to opposite places, then a mixed body is moved by force wherever it is moved, and it would rest by force because of something else, namely some other element.

4. Again everything composed of contraries is corrupted of itself and from within; but not every mixed body is corrupted from within, as stone and metals and that sort of thing, which are not nourished; therefore not every mixed body is composed of elements remaining in it in substance.

5. On the contrary, from Aristotle On Generation ch.90 (on mixture), who says, ‘A mixture is the union of altered things.’ From this comes a twofold argument: because he says it is a union of altered, not corrupted, things, and second because he says it is a union, but a union is only of existing entities.

6. Again, a proper feature only exists in its proper subject; but the features of the elements exist in the mixed body, as is plain;     therefore etc     .

To the Question

7. I reply that Avicenna’s opinion, as the Commentator cites it in On Generation 1 ch. on mixture and On the Heavens 3 com.67, was that the elements remain in the mixed body not in diminished substantial forms but in diminished qualities.

8. Against this the Commentator himself argues as follows: The parts of quality are of the same idea as the whole quality; if therefore a part of quality can be diminished when the substantial form of the element is not diminished, by parity of reasoning the whole quality can be diminished, and so the element will remain without its natural quality, as fire without heat, which is impossible. The Commentator therefore posits that the elements remain in the mixed body both in substance and in accidents.

9. But he argues against himself in three ways: first, that then the form of the mixed body will be accidental, because it will come to a being in act that is composed of matter and substantial form; second, because then the form of the element would receive the more and less, which is against the Philosopher in the Categories; third, he says that the receptive thing must lack the form of what is received; therefore matter must lack every substantial form when it receives the form of a mixed body. To this last argument I say that it is enough for the matter to lack the form of the species.

10. On the contrary: when water remains water it will be able to receive the nature of fire, although fire is of another species. Therefore at the end of his comment the Commentator suggests another reason by saying that the forms of the elements are of a different idea and order from the forms of mixed bodies; he then says that the receptive thing must lack the whole nature of a received thing of the same order.

11. To his second argument [n.9] I say that the forms of the elements are intermediate between accidental and substantial forms, and so they can receive the more and the less. The response to the first argument is plain from the same point. For from the fact that they are intermediate they do not fully constitute an actual being. I say also that the argument against Avicenna [n.8] does not conclude. For I concede that a part of quality and the whole quality are of the same idea with each other, but not in comparison with a third thing, namely the subject, because the part can have a contingent relation to the subject that the whole does not have. An example: this body has a contingent relation to this place and that, because it can exist without this place and without that, but it cannot exist without any pace at all.

12. I reply to the question therefore by contradicting both Avicenna and the Commentator. For I say that the elements do not remain in the mixed body, either as to diminished forms and qualities or as to undiminished ones. The reason is that any substantial corporeal form is accompanied by its proper quality; therefore, if the forms of the elements exist in a mixed body, then, since they are substantial and corporeal, either no part of the mixed body will be mixed or two bodies will be together at the same time, as is plain.

13. Again a mixed body is generated from the elements by true generation; therefore the form of the element, which is the term from-which, is incompossible with the form of the mixed body, which is the term to-which. For the formal terms of generation are incompossible.

14. Again, any substantial form naturally produces a proper supposit with its proper matter, unless it is a form subordinate to another and more perfect form, as the vegetative and sensitive forms; but the forms of the elements are not subordinate to each other, although all are subordinate to the form of the mixed body; therefore there would in one mixed body be four supposits just as there would be four elements, because any form of an element would, along with the form of the mixed body it is subordinate to, constitute one supposit.

15. I say that just as red is said to be mixed from white and black - not because white and black remain in red in their proper forms, however diminished (for everyone holds that an intermediate color is simple like the extremes) - but because of a certain agreement that red has with the extremes, which agreement the extremes do not have with each other. In this way is a mixed body said to be composed of elements, because of an agreement it has with the elements that the elements do not have with each other.

16. And I also say that the form of a mixed body contains the elements virtually, just as the intellect contains in its own way the vegetative and the sensitive, and from this containing arises the said agreement.

17. This is Aristotle’s meaning, since after he has first said that the elements remain in the mixed body, he at once adds an explanation as to how their power is preserved.

18. I say accordingly also that a mixed body is not generated from all the elements. Hence in On Generation 1.2 it is said that water is productive. Hence fish are sometimes generated from water alone, and likewise one mixed body is generated only from another, as is plain. I say of the qualities of the elements the same as was said of their substantial forms.

To the Arguments

19. There is no need to respond to the first initial arguments [nn.2-4], although the last one does pose a difficulty and the second one does not conclude much.

20. To the first argument for the opposite [n.5] I say that, in the ultimate instant of the coming to be of generation, the mixable elements are corrupted, but up to that point they are altered, otherwise things would not be generated. But ‘union’ is meant there as union in a single resultant effect, because the mixable elements, which are contained there virtually, are united in the form of the mixed body which, when the others are corrupted, is introduced.

21. To the second [n.6] I say that not the properties of the elements are there but ones similar to them.